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OPINION 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge.
 In this consolidated proceeding, Ramon Williams asks 
us to consider whether a prior conviction under Georgia’s 
forgery statute, Ga. Code Ann. § 16-9-1(a) (2006), constitutes 
an aggravated felony conviction for purposes of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”).  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Because we conclude that the Georgia 
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conviction is an offense “relating to . . . forgery,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(R), Williams is properly subject to removal as 
an aggravated felon, and we will therefore deny the petitions 
for review. 
I. 
Williams, a citizen of Guyana and a lawful permanent 
resident of the United States, immigrated to this country in 
1970, when he was thirteen months old.  He has no family in 
Guyana; his parents, grandparents, siblings, and children are 
all United States citizens.  In 2006, he pleaded guilty in 
Georgia state court to five counts of first degree forgery 
pursuant to section 16-9-1(a) of the Georgia Code.  He initially 
received a sentence of two years in prison, which later was 
reduced to one year. 
In 2013, Williams received a notice to appear charging 
him as removable as a result of having been convicted of an 
aggravated felony.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  
Appearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) in New Jersey, 
he contested removability.1  The IJ determined that the Georgia 
forgery conviction rendered Williams deportable as an 
aggravated felon and otherwise denied relief.  Williams 
appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  
                                           
1 Williams also sought asylum, withholding of removal, 
and relief under the Convention Against Torture.  The IJ 
denied these forms of relief and the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed.  Williams does not challenge 
the denial of those claims in his petitions before this Court. 
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Before the BIA, he argued, inter alia, that the Georgia forgery 
statute is broader than generic forgery because it criminalizes 
the use of a fictitious name when signing a document and 
because the statute does not require a showing of prejudice.  
The BIA rejected these arguments, upheld the IJ’s decision, 
and dismissed the appeal. 
Williams timely filed a petition for review, and also 
sought reconsideration before the BIA in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 
(2016).  In his motion for reconsideration, Williams argued that 
Georgia’s forgery statute is indivisible under Mathis and is 
overbroad because it criminalizes some conduct that does not 
relate to forgery, namely, false agency endorsements.  The BIA 
denied the reconsideration motion, and Williams timely filed a 
second petition for review.   
The petitions have been consolidated.  We have 
jurisdiction over them pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
II. 
  The issue of whether Williams’s conviction under the 
Georgia forgery statute qualifies as an aggravated felony is a 
question of law over which we have jurisdiction.  Id. § 
1252(a)(2)(D).  We conduct a de novo review of the BIA’s 
determination.  Denis v. Atty. Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir. 
2011); Bobb v. Atty. Gen., 458 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2006).   
III. 
 The INA provides for the deportation of an alien “who 
is convicted of an aggravated felony.”  8 U.S.C. 
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§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  The INA’s definition of an “aggravated 
felony” encompasses an extensive list of various types of 
offenses, see id. § 1101(a)(43)(A)–(U), but for current 
purposes, only one definition is pertinent: an “aggravated 
felony” is “an offense relating to . . . forgery . . . for which the 
term of imprisonment is at least one year.”  Id. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(R).  In his petitions for review, Williams calls 
upon us to consider whether the BIA was correct when it 
determined that his 2006 conviction under Georgia’s forgery 
statute, for which he was imprisoned for a year, is an “offense 
relating to forgery.” 
A. 
 At the time of Williams’s conviction, Georgia’s 
forgery statute provided:  
A person commits the offense of forgery in the 
first degree when with intent to defraud he 
knowingly makes, alters or possesses any writing 
in a fictitious name or in such manner that the 
writing as made or altered purports to have been 
made by another person, at another time, with 
different provisions, or by authority of one who 
did not give such authority and utters or delivers 
such writing. 
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-9-1(a) (2006).  The Georgia legislature’s 
decision to denote this offense as “forgery” does not dictate 
whether it comes within the meaning of forgery as Congress 
intended it in the INA.  Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 248 
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(3d Cir. 2001) (“The language of a federal statute must be 
construed to have the meaning intended by Congress, not the 
[state] legislature.”).  To make that assessment, we employ 
what is known as the “categorical approach.”2  See Moncrieffe 
v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013).   
                                           
2 While this is the general rule, certain disjunctively-
worded statutes that set forth a number of separate crimes 
warrant a departure from the categorical approach known 
as the “modified categorical approach.”  Mathis v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016); see Moncrieffe v. 
Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 191 (2013).  When it applies, the 
modified categorical approach permits a court to consult a 
limited set of documents, such as an indictment, guilty 
plea, or jury instructions, to determine which specific 
offense is at issue in the case.  Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191.  
In Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248–50, the Supreme Court 
provided guidance regarding how to determine whether a 
disjunctively-worded state statute sets forth an 
“indivisible” set of elements defining a single crime—but 
listing several different means of satisfying the elements 
of the crime—to which the strict categorical approach 
applies, or a “divisible” list of elements in the 
alternative—thereby defining multiple separate crimes—
to which the modified categorical approach applies.  
Georgia’s forgery statute is undoubtedly disjunctive and, 
initially, the issue of its divisibility or indivisibility under 
Mathis was hotly contested.  At oral argument, however, 
the Government conceded its agreement with Williams’s 
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 Under the categorical approach, we look to the 
substance of the statute of conviction to determine whether it 
categorically fits within the “generic” federal definition of the 
corresponding aggravated felony, without considering the facts 
of the particular case.  Id.; see also Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249 
(“The comparison of elements that the categorical approach 
requires is straightforward . . . .  The court . . . lines up that 
crime’s elements alongside those of the generic offense and 
sees if they match.”).  We thus compare the state and federal 
offenses “in the abstract,” consulting only their respective 
elements to determine whether the state conviction 
“necessarily involved facts equating to the generic federal 
offense.”  Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190 (internal quotation 
marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Shepard v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 13, 24 (2005)). 
 Before we may conduct this comparison, we must 
consider what constitutes the “generic federal offense” of 
forgery.  See id.  As we observed in Drakes v. Zimski, Congress 
has not articulated a specific definition for the term.  240 F.3d 
at 249.  “Where federal criminal statutes use words of 
established meaning without further elaboration, courts 
typically give those terms their common law definition.”  Id.  
As we have long held, the traditional common law definition 
of forgery has three elements:  “(a) The false making or 
                                           
view that the statute defines a single crime and is therefore 
indivisible, warranting the application of the categorical 
approach.  Accordingly, for our purposes, we assume 
without deciding that the parties are correct that the 
categorical approach applies. 
 9 
 
material alteration (b) with intent to defraud (c) of a writing 
which, if genuine, might be of legal efficacy.”  United States v. 
McGovern, 661 F.2d 27, 29 (3d Cir. 1981).  Moreover, 
because the INA applies not only to forgery, but also extends 
to offenses “relating to” forgery, we have concluded that 
Congress intended to define forgery “in its broadest sense.”  
Drakes, 240 F.3d at 249.   
 Here, however, the definition of the term “forgery” is 
not enough, on its own, to answer the question of whether the 
crime defined in section 16-9-1 of the Georgia Code is “an 
offense relating to forgery” within the meaning of the INA.  
Accordingly, in comparing the generic federal offense to the 
Georgia statute, we employ a “looser categorical approach.”  
Flores v. Atty. Gen., 856 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(applying this approach in analyzing whether an alien had been 
convicted of offenses “relating to obstruction of justice”).  
Under this looser approach, we do not require a precise match 
between the elements of the generic federal crime and those of 
the Georgia offense.  Id. at 291.  Instead, we “survey the[ir] 
interrelationship” and consider whether there is “a logical or 
causal connection” between them.  Id. (quoting Denis, 633 
F.3d at 212).  We may conclude that the crimes are logically 
connected if they both “target the same, core criminal conduct 
such that they are ‘directly analogous.’”  Id.  And, we may 
conclude that the crimes are causally connected where there is 
a “link between the alien’s offense and a listed federal crime: 
without the listed federal offense, the alien’s offense could not 
have occurred.”  Id.  Because the parties agree that there is no 
“causal connection” between the federal and state crimes under 
discussion here, our focus is the “logical connection” between 
them. 
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B. 
 Williams’s primary claim is that the Georgia forgery 
statute is broader than the federal common law definition of 
forgery because it punishes the possession of certain “genuine” 
documents, namely, documents that “purport[ ] to have been 
made . . . by authority of one who did not give such authority.”  
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-9-1(b).  Williams refers to this aspect of 
the Georgia statute as “false agency endorsement,” which, he 
argues, is conduct that does not fall within the traditional 
common law definition of forgery.  
 As a threshold matter, the Government argues that, 
although false agency endorsement may technically fall within 
the Georgia statute’s language, Georgia does not actually 
prosecute false agency endorsement as forgery.  Accordingly, 
the Government claims, Williams has established no more than 
a “theoretical possibility” that Georgia would apply its statute 
to conduct falling outside the federal definition of forgery.  See 
Singh, 839 F.3d at 278.   
 Williams responds that there is Georgia case law 
demonstrating that the State actually prosecutes false agency 
endorsement as forgery, citing Warren v. State, 711 S.E.2d 108 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2011).  In Warren, a business manager of a 
medical practice used business checks to pay personal credit 
card debt without the authorization of her employer.  The Court 
of Appeals of Georgia concluded that the evidence was 
sufficient to support her conviction of first degree forgery 
because it showed that, “with intent to defraud the doctor and 
his medical practice, she knowingly possessed fifty-two checks 
drawn on the practice’s bank account without authority, and 
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uttered the checks as payment on her personal credit card 
debt.”  Id. at 109.   
 In a supplemental appendix, Williams provided a copy 
of the Warren indictment as further support for his position that 
the Georgia forgery statute is employed to prosecute false 
agency endorsement.  See S.A.  1–18.  The indictment indicates 
that the defendant was charged with first degree forgery for 
signing her own name to a check, “purportedly on behalf of 
[the medical practice] as an authorized signatory of [the 
medical practice], but having not been written and signed with 
the authority of [the medical practice and the doctor], and did 
utter said check.”  S.A. 2, Count 5.  In other words, the Warren 
defendant’s signature was her own but was made without 
authorization of the principal, and therefore was a false agency 
endorsement.  Inasmuch as both the Warren indictment and the 
opinion of the Court of Appeals of Georgia support Williams’ 
view, and the Government has not offered anything to rebut 
that evidence, we conclude that Williams has established a 
sufficiently “realistic probability” that Georgia would apply its 
forgery statute to false agency endorsement.  See Singh, 839 
F.3d at 278 (quoting Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191). 
 Next, Williams contends that, in contrast to the Georgia 
statute, the federal common law definition of forgery does not 
extend to false agency endorsement, making the Georgia 
statute broader than the federal version of the crime.  But 
whatever the scope of forgery under federal law, Congress 
expressly extended its coverage to offenses “relating to” 
forgery.  We must therefore resolve the question of whether the 
Georgia statute’s inclusion of false agency endorsement 
extends so far beyond the traditional common law definition 
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that it criminalizes conduct that is unrelated to forgery.  
Employing the looser categorical approach, we conclude it 
does not.  See Flores, 856 F.3d at 286. 
 Williams argues that false agency endorsements do not 
relate to forgery because they do not involve a “false 
instrument,” and a false instrument, he contends, is at the core 
of the federal common law crime.  See Pet. Br. at 29.  Although 
a false instrument is an integral aspect of common law forgery, 
we cannot agree with Williams’s argument that the falsity of 
the instrument must appear on the face of the document in 
order for an offense to “relate to” forgery.  Even if facial falsity 
is viewed as an essential element of common law forgery that 
is missing from the provision of Georgia’s statute prohibiting 
false agency endorsement, the omission of an essential element 
simply does not resolve whether the conduct is “related” for 
purposes of the INA.  See Bobb, 458 F.3d at 219.  
 In conducting the necessary survey of the 
interrelationship between common law forgery and false 
agency endorsement, we are satisfied that, although their 
elements do not line up with precision, the crimes share a 
logical connection.  See Flores, 856 F.3d at 291.  We offer a 
series of related examples to demonstrate the analogous nature 
of the two crimes, taken from the example in Warren, the 
Georgia case to which Williams refers.   
 First, we consider the most straightforward scenario: if 
the defendant in Warren had signed her employer’s name 
rather than her own name on the business checks, then we may 
uncontroversially conclude that her act would fall within the 
quintessential common law definition of forgery.  The forged 
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instrument would, on its face, reflect the sort of falsity in 
execution that Williams proposes is integral to the definition of 
the common law crime—the use of a false name.  Next, we 
consider a slightly different but related scenario, in which the 
defendant signs her true name to the employer’s checks under 
the handwritten phrase “by authority of” her employer—
authority that was never granted.  Much like the signing of a 
false name, the falsity of the authorization would appear on the 
face of the document, and we therefore presume that Williams 
would agree that the defendant’s hypothetical act would be 
related to forgery.3  Finally, consider the conduct for which the 
Warren defendant actually was prosecuted: she signed her true 
name to a check, implicitly under the authority of her 
employer, but without writing the phrase “by authority of.”  By 
Williams’s logic, this third example would not be a “false 
instrument” because there is no falsity on the document’s face, 
and the defendant’s act therefore would no longer relate to 
forgery.  But, in our view, each of these incrementally different 
acts is logically related to the same underlying core conduct.  
See Flores, 856 F.3d at 291.  Each example gives rise to 
essentially the same concerns about the inauthenticity and 
unauthorized nature of the written instrument.  Thus, we think 
Williams’s proposed approach of drawing a bright line at facial 
                                           
3 We note that Williams has never contended that use of a false 
name is the only manner in which a document can qualify as a 
“false instrument” for purposes of common law forgery.  At 
oral argument, Williams contended that, for instance, 
mimicking a company’s logo to create a false check would 
qualify as the false making of a document and therefore is a 
form of forgery. 
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falsity presents too fine a distinction given the broad “relating 
to” language that Congress chose to employ in the INA.  In 
short, common law forgery and false agency endorsement 
share a logical connection because they “target the same, core 
criminal conduct such that they are ‘directly analogous.’”  See 
id. 
 The Government also points us to the Model Penal Code 
and a number of state statutes employing the Model Penal 
Code’s provisions as a source for a “broad minority definition” 
of forgery that extends to false agency endorsement.  See 
Model Penal Code § 224.1(1)(b) (Am. Law Inst. 1985) (“A 
person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud or injure 
anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud or 
injury to be perpetrated by anyone, the actor . . . makes, 
completes, executes, authenticates, issues or transfers any 
writing so that it purports to be the act of another who did not 
authorize that act . . . .”); see also Iowa Code § 715A.2(1)(b) 
(1996); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:21-1(a)(2) (West 2002); 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 4101(a)(2) (2003); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-
602(a)(ii) (2007).  We have observed that conduct falling 
within a “broad minority definition” can be an appropriate 
source of information for discerning whether conduct “relates 
to” an offense for INA purposes.  Drakes, 240 F.3d at 250.  We 
conclude that the Model Penal Code’s broad minority 
definition of forgery buttresses our conclusion that false 
agency endorsement shares a logical connection with common 
law forgery. 
 To our knowledge, only one other Court of Appeals has 
published a decision interpreting § 1101(a)(43)(R) in the 
context of a state statute that, like the Georgia statute, defines 
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forgery in a manner that encompasses false agency 
endorsement.  In Vizcarra-Ayala v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 870 
(9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit noted, as we have, that the 
Supreme Court and other Circuits have concluded that forgery 
requires “falsification of a document or instrument,” making it 
“clear that an essential element of the generic offense of 
forgery is the false making or alteration of a document, such 
that the document is not what it purports to be.”  Id. at 875.  
The Ninth Circuit then cited several cases in which California 
had prosecuted individuals for “possession or use of a genuine 
instrument with intent to defraud but not to forge,” in other 
words, conduct falling outside the generic federal definition of 
forgery.  Id. at 876.  And, it described one particular case in 
which California prosecuted false agency endorsement under 
its forgery statute: a defendant office manager took checks 
from her employer and, rather than use them for purchasing 
office supplies, made the checks out to “cash” and used the 
proceeds for herself.  Id. at 876–77.  In that case, the checks 
were genuine and the defendant’s signatures on them were 
true.  Id. at 877.  According to the Ninth Circuit, this “made 
her conduct fraud, but not forgery under the generic 
definition.”  Id. 
   Up to this point, we concur with the Ninth Circuit’s 
analysis.  But, we diverge from its ultimate conclusion: that the 
California statute’s application to “genuine instrument[s],” 
including false agency endorsements, means that it extends to 
conduct that does not “relate to” forgery.  Id. at 876–77.  
Relying on a facial falsity premise much like the one Williams 
proposes, the Ninth Circuit summarily concluded that 
“[e]xpanding the definition of offenses ‘relating to’ forgery to 
include conduct where documents are not altered or falsified 
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[would] stretch[] the scope too far.”  Id. at 877.  Because we 
conclude that concerns about the inauthenticity or 
unauthorized nature of a written instrument establish a logical 
relationship between common law forgery and false agency 
endorsement, we respectfully disagree with the premise that 
the falsity of the instrument must be reflected on its face in 
order for conduct to “relate to” forgery.   
 Another important distinction is the degree to which the 
“relating to” language of § 1101(a)(43)(R) affects the analysis.  
While in this Circuit it triggers the application of the “looser 
categorical approach” and its “logical or causal connection” 
test, Flores, 856 F.3d at 286, 291, the Ninth Circuit in 
Vizcarra-Ayala acknowledged only that offenses with a causal 
connection can “relate to” forgery (e.g., possession of a forged 
document), but declined to afford logical connections like the 
one at issue there the same treatment, see 514 F.3d at 877.  The 
Ninth Circuit’s test for whether a state offense “relat[es] to . . . 
forgery” is more restrictive than this Court’s, and here, that 
difference was outcome-determinative. 
C. 
Williams presents a secondary argument as to the 
purported overbreadth of the Georgia forgery statute, 
contending that the Georgia statute is missing a necessary 
element of federal common law forgery: a requirement that the 
forged instrument be “capable of effecting a fraud” or have 
“legal efficacy.”  Relatedly, Williams argues that the absence 
of the “legal efficacy” element extends Georgia’s statute 
beyond the commercial realm into merely “personal” acts and 
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such personal acts do not relate to forgery for purposes of the 
INA.4 
 The Government retorts that Williams waived this 
argument because he did not present it to the BIA.  Williams 
disagrees, pointing out that he argued before the BIA that the 
Georgia statute “lacked a prejudice requirement,” an argument 
that the BIA considered and rejected.  See J.A. 43–44.  While 
acknowledging that he used different terminology, Williams 
contends that his argument to the BIA—that the Georgia 
statute lacks an element of “prejudice [to] another”—is 
sufficiently similar to his argument to this Court—that the 
Georgia statute lacks an element of being “capable of 
prejudicing another’s rights.”  Reply Br. at 19.  He argues that 
precision is not required and that his prejudice argument below 
was sufficient to put the BIA on notice of the issue.   
 We accept that the claim presented on appeal is 
sufficiently similar to the argument presented to the BIA to 
satisfy the exhaustion requirement.  Nonetheless, we are not 
persuaded that it has merit.  In Bobb, we observed that, “[a]t 
                                           
4 Upon being questioned about the contours of this claim at oral 
argument, Williams all but abandoned it, candidly 
acknowledging that this was not his “primary argument” and 
that the false agency endorsement claim presented a “much 
closer question.”  Oral Argument at 5:49–8:58, Williams v. 
Atty. Gen., Nos. 16-3816, 17-1705 (3d Cir. Nov. 8, 2017).  
Williams’s response was sufficiently equivocal to leave us 
with some doubt as to whether this argument has been waived, 
so we proceed to address its merits. 
 
 18 
 
their core, all common law forgery offenses contain as an 
element an intent to deceive.”  458 F.3d at 218.  Analogously, 
the Georgia forgery statute expressly sets forth an “intent to 
defraud” as one element of the crime.  Ga. Code Ann. § 16-9-
1(a).  These intent elements are “directly analogous” and target 
the “same core criminal conduct.”  See Flores, 856 F.3d at 291.   
 To the extent Williams contends that the common law 
definition goes a step further by looking to the potential effect 
of the forged instrument on its victim rather than the intent of 
the forger alone, such a minute distinction does not carry the 
day.  Even apart from our skepticism about this claim, in Bobb, 
we observed that a state criminal statute can relate to forgery 
even where it “encompasses conduct beyond the traditional 
definition of forgery, and includes criminal conduct that is 
causally connected to forgery, but may lack as an essential 
element an intent to defraud or deceive.”  458 F.3d at 219.  
Thus, so long as the Georgia statute covers conduct that is 
logically or causally connected to forgery—which, 
undoubtedly, it does—it is of no moment that a supposed 
additional “essential element” of the generic federal definition, 
such as the ability of the forged instrument to cause harm to a 
victim, might theoretically be absent from the Georgia statute.  
See id.   
 Moreover, there is no basis for concluding that the 
Georgia statute lacks this element and therefore extends to 
conduct that is purely “personal” or “non-commercial” in 
nature.  Notably, Williams offers no evidence to support his 
contention that there is a “personal” version of forgery that 
would be subject to prosecution in Georgia and yet be 
exempted from the federal common law conception of fraud.  
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We see no “realistic probability” that the State would apply its 
forgery statute in this manner.  Singh, 839 F.3d at 278 (quoting 
Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191).  Accordingly, Williams’s 
argument fails. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, these consolidated petitions 
for review will be denied.5 
                                           
5 In his brief, Williams offers a final argument, contending that 
he should not be subject to removal because removal is a 
punishment disproportionate to his crime and should be set 
aside as unconstitutional under the Fifth or Eighth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution.  He stated, 
however, that he offered the argument solely for the purpose of 
preserving the issue for future review, acknowledging that we 
are bound by our precedent holding that removal is not a 
punishment and is therefore not subject to challenge as a 
disproportionate punishment under the Fifth or Eighth 
Amendment.  Sunday v. Atty. Gen., 832 F.3d 211, 218–19 (3d 
Cir. 2016).  Relying upon Sunday, we will not further address 
the proportionality argument.   
